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Abstract
We report our preliminary study on an improved triple modular computer system from the aerospace ﬁeld,
which is designed to compute the course of action that other subsystems take and output the result to other
subsystems. Based on the formal model of the system, we derive constraints on the values of the parameters
that occur in our model, and manually prove that “ When a CPU is in the startup phase, it should not restart
again due to its watchdog timer overﬂow or a restart signal sent from the arbitrator ”.
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1 Introduction
In safety-critical applications, ranging from national defense to interests of com-
mercial companies and private citizens, techniques of fault tolerant computing are
important and eﬀective to improve the reliability and dependability of real-time
systems [1,7,8].
In this paper, we present our study on a triple modular computer system from
the aerospace ﬁeld, which is designed to compute the course of action that other
subsystems take and output the result to other subsystems. This work is based
on our early experiment and improvement on a design originally given to us by the
practical engineer. In the experiment, we analyzed the drawbacks of the design, and
suggested a design that provides more eﬀective fault-tolerance. In the improvement
[6], we endow each component of the system with more functions. Then we give
a formal model of the improved system using a network of timed automaton [9] in
UPPAAL [10]. The detailed C code speciﬁcation can be easily read and translated
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to Verilog hardware language by the engineers. We further prove that with the
timing parameters the hardware engineers provide, the improved system satisﬁes a
list of important functionality requirements. Among these, the most important one
is T , which is “ When a CPU is in the startup phase, it can not restart again due to
its watchdog timer overﬂow or a restart signal sent from the arbitrator ”.
However, UPPAAL does not support parameters so we need to instantiate the
parameters for some values in diﬀerent hardware environments to check whether
or not T is fulﬁlled. In our current work, we improve on the above results in two
ways: (1) we ﬁnd constraints on the parameters that ensure satisfaction of property
T ; (2) we prove manually with the parametric constraints, the system satisﬁes the
correctness property. Therefore, rather than verifying the correctness of the system
for a single, speciﬁc choice of parameter values like in UPPAAL, we derive (by
hand) general constraints on the parameters which ensure correctness and give the
correctness proof. Such technique has been applied in other case study, such as lego
car system [12].
As shown by our earlier work, the system falls into the case of the big state
space problem [13,14].To make the testing and veriﬁcation with ﬁxed parameter
values practically feasible, several abstraction techniques have been applied in the
modeling previously. Still the same for the manual proof in our current paper, there
is no interconnection between any two of the CPUs, and each voter can independently
judge whether its corresponding CPU needs a restart. Thus, the properties T of the
system can be described and manually proved by working on a simpliﬁed version of
the system with only one CPU, one voter and one arbitrator.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the orig-
inal triple modular redundancy system and an improved version of the system,
focusing on the augmented functions of the voter and the arbitrator. With a net-
work of timed automata, Section 3 gives a formal model of the improved system in
UPPAAL. Section 4 presents the correctness properties that we want to prove, the
constraints needed for their validity. Section 5 roughly gives the correctness proofs.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Improved Triple Modular Fault Tolerant Computer
System
2.1 The Original One
The original system mainly consists of the components: three CPUs, two voters, one
arbitrator and one impulse generator.
2.1.1 Impulse generator
The impulse generator issues edge impulses to force the components to process
their inputs. In a cycle, a synchronization impulse synclk xms is generated ﬁrst
to let the three CPUs process their inputs simultaneously. After a certain period
CPU PERIOD of time, a synclk 5xms impulse is generated to trigger the two voters
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to process their inputs simultaneously. Impulse synclk 9xms is produced a pe-
riod VOTER PERIOD of time afterwards since the sending of synclk 5xms to activate
the arbitrator to process its inputs. A synclk xms impulse is produced again af-
ter a period of ARBI PERIOD time since the sending of synclk 9xms impulse. So,
all the three types of impulses are generated in a T-cycle, where T is equal to
CPU PERIOD+ VOTER PERIOD+ ARBI PERIOD.
2.1.2 CPU
As a CPU starts, it ﬁrst enters a reset phase and stays there for a period C before
it enters a startup phase, in which it may stay for maximally a period of RUB time.
In other words, from the time when CPU jumps to startup phase till the time when
it is in working status, the period lies in the interval [0, RUB]. In the hardware
design, the voltage change of a special pin from the CPU illustrates this procedure:
the voltage value stays in the low level (0) for a period C before it is changed to the
high level (1). We use a Boolean array flag to denote the value of pin voltage of
the CPUs. Thus, the fact that flag[i] is 0 implies that CPU i is in the reset phase,
and it is in the startup phase or working status otherwise.
A CPU receives various sampling data as its inputs and computes results as
outputs. Let cpu voter fifo[i] denote the buﬀer that stores the output of CPU i,
that can be read by its voters. After receiving a synclk xms impulse at some time
t, all the three CPUs start to execute the following actions simultaneously.
(i) Clear the data in buﬀer cpu voter fifo which are the results from the last
cycle.
(ii) Process and compute the inputs.
(iii) Output the processing result to cpu voter fifo.
Among these actions, the second action to process and compute the inputs takes
more time than the other two actions do. When a computation times out, that is,
when processing time is equal to or bigger than CPU PERIOD, the program installed
on the CPU may enter into a deadlock or an inﬁnite loop. So the inputs a voter later
reads are incorrect.
2.1.3 Watchdog
Each CPU is connected with an exterior watchdog. The watchdog timer starts to
record the time elapsed since the connected CPU enters into a startup phase. In
the normal mode, the CPU kicks the watchdog periodically with timer being set to
the value RWD. If the CPU is hanging or is unable to work correctly, it then fails
to periodically reset the watchdog timer. As a consequence, the timer expires a
constant WD UB. In this case, the CPU is considered to have a permanent fault and
is switched oﬀ. A signal demotion from watchdog is issued to trigger that.
2.1.4 Voters
The system includes two voters, voter0 and voter1, which respectively judge the
result of which CPU is perfect. Triggered by a impulse synclk 5xms, they start to
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process their inputs simultaneously. The purpose to have two of them is to avoid
the voter as a single point of failure that reduces the overall fault tolerance behavior
of the system. We use a boolean variable voter status to describe if a voter is
faulty or not, where 1 indicates the voter is faulty. In our later model, to reduce
system behaviors, we assume all the voters are not faulty. This assumption will not
alter the checking results of the interested properties.
Whenever voter0 and voter1 receive a synclk 5xms impulse, they simultaneously
start to process the input data to determine which CPU works correctly and select
the correct result. The time spent on data processing for each voter may be diﬀerent
but it is bounded by a constant VOTER PERIOD.
2.1.5 Arbitrator
Upon detecting a synclk 9xms impulse, the arbitrator starts to work. Depending
on the statuses of the voters, i.e, if voter is faulty or not, and whether a voter is
primary or not, the arbitrator decides to output either the result of voter0 or voter1.
We use arbitrator data to denote the arbitrator output. To insure the arbitrator
completes the computation before the arrival of synclk xms impulse that triggers
the next CPU cycle, the computation time the arbitrator requires must be less than
ARBI PERIOD.
2.2 System Improvement
The purpose of this system is to successfully use the three-modular mode mechanism
as often as possible. However, the system designed up to now has several disad-
vantages (1) as soon as watchdog timer overﬂows, the connected CPU is switched oﬀ
even if the CPU fault is resumable, (2) even though an inﬁnite computation loop will
generate incorrect results to a voter all the time, the watchdog is kicked normally
during that time.
In both cases,triple modular redundancy is changed to two modular redundancy,
which weakens fault-tolerance eﬀect. A CPU restart mechanism can solve the above
problems. Therefore, to solve both problems, we deﬁne a mechanism that addresses
the following aspects.
(i) When does a CPU need a restart? When and which component will trigger this
restart?
(ii) When is CPU considered to have a permanent fault and to be switched oﬀ.
To answer these question, we need to add new functionalities to each component.
These require us to introduce new information and coordinate these information
ﬂowed in between these components.
2.2.1 CPU Restart and Permanent Fault
Compared with the previous system, each CPU is now augmented with a restart
function. A watchdog timer overﬂow will cause the restart of the CPU instead of
considering it as a permanent fault to be switched oﬀ. Besides, not only can the
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watchdog trigger a restart of the CPU, but the arbitrator will also send a restart
signal to the CPU if needed. The details on how a voter together with the arbitrator
judges whether the CPU needs to restart will be described in the following subsection.
In the improved system, we also require that a CPU should be switched oﬀ when-
ever it has a permanent fault. However the judgement when a CPU is considered to
have a permanent fault needs to be reﬁned. As said previously, a CPU is regarded to
be permanently faulty when the connected watchdog timer expires. While for the
new system the modiﬁcation is: when a CPU continuously has restarted six times,
each voter together with the arbitrator decide that the CPU has a permanent fault.
For a voter to detect if a CPU, for instance CPU i, has restarted, the information
regarding CPU i is either in the reset phase or the startup phase, that is flag[i],
is relayed to voter. The value change of flag[i] from 1 to 0 indicates a restart of
CPU i.
2.2.2 Improvement of Voter
In addition to the old functionalities, each voter is enhanced with the following
functionalities in the new system.
Decide if CPU i works normally
If the data that voter j reads from the output buﬀer of CPU i, that is
cpu voter fifo[i] is correct, CPU i is considered to be in normal status. We de-
note this by setting a local boolean variable cpu normal by voter[3× j+ i] to 1.
If voter j ﬁnds a value change of flag[i] from 1 to 0, it then judges that CPU i is in
non-normal status by assigning 0 to cpu normal by voter[3× j+ i]. The value of
cpu normal by voter[3× j+ i] being 0 is not altered in the later cycles until voter
j reads correct data from CPU i. So the normal status and the non-normal status
of CPU are decided by voter.
Judge if CPU i needs a restart or not
Let restart flag by voter[3× j+ i] be boolean variable. It is used to indicate
voter j has judged whether or not CPU i needs a restart. To make the watchdog,
that takes some time for its timer to overﬂow, to be eﬀective, we allow a CPU to
output a number of incorrect values before it it is restarted. We introduce two
parameters n1 and n2, which are positive integers. When CPU i is in the normal
mode, voter j triggers it to restart by setting restart flag by voter[3× j+ i]
to 1, after having contiguously having received n1 incorrect values from CPU i.
Similarly, when CPU i is in the abnormal mode, voter j triggers the CPU to restart
after continuously having received n2 incorrect data.
Count the number of restart times of CPU i
To judge if CPU i has a permanent fault and thus needs to be switched oﬀ,
voter j needs to count how many times CPU i has continuously restarted. A vari-
able restart count by voter[3× j+ i] is used to record the number of times of
restart of CPU i judged by voter j. If voter j ﬁnds that flag[i] varies from 1 to 0,
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restart count by voter[3× j+ i] is increased by 1. It is set to 0 if voter j reads
a correct data from cpu voter fifo[i]. The values of restart flag by voter and
restart count by voter are later read by the arbitrator.
2.2.3 Improvement of Arbitrator
Upon receiving a synclk 9xms impulse, the arbitrator acquires the outputs of each
voter, which include four kinds of information: the voting result of each voter,
the voter’s status, whether each CPU needs a restart or not, number of times of
restarts of each CPU. Depending on the voter’s status, for instance, if voter0 is
good, the arbitrator decides to use the result of vote0 and sends a restart signal
dsp restart[i] to CPU i if restart flag by voter[i] is 1.
Moreover, arbitrator is equipped with a function to send a modular degradation
signal by setting the boolean variable demotion[i] to 1 in case when it decides there
is a permanent fault in CPU i. Based on the status of the voters, the arbitrator deter-
mines if it should believe in the outputs of voter0 or that of voter1. Secondly if the
arbitrator deems voter j is good, then it checks if restart flag by voter[3× j+ i]
is equal to 6. If it is, the arbitrator determines that CPU i has a permanent fault
and triggers it to be switched oﬀ. The current system and information ﬂow be-
tween components is shown in Fig. 1. The thick arrows in the ﬁgure show the new
information exchange, compared with the previous system.
impulse generator
CPU0
watchdog
RWD
synclk xms synclk 5ms synclk 9ms
ﬂag(0;1;2)
cpu voter ﬁfo(0;1;2)
voter status(0;1)
restart ﬂag by voter(0;1;...5)
restart count by voter(0;1;...5)
voter0
arbitrator
arbitrator data
dsp restart(0;1;2)
demotion(0;1;2)
CPU2
watchdog
RWD
...
voter1
voter output(0;1)
Fig. 1. Triple modular redundancy system after improvement
3 System Model
Based on the modiﬁed system, we give a formal model of the system with ﬁve
automata: Impulse, CPU, Voter, Arbitrator and Demoter. We refer to [6] for
more detailed explanation of the model.
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3.1 Impulse
Figure 2(a) displays the automaton Impulse, which speciﬁes how the impulse gen-
erator produces edge impulse in turn. Clock x is used to record the time passing in
between sending two edge impulses.
to_send_arbi_sync
x<=VOTER_PERIOD
to_send_voter_sync
x<=CPU_PERIOD
to_send_cpu_sync
x<=ARBI_PERIOD
x == VOTER_PERIOD
synclk_x9ms!
x=0
x == CPU_PERIOD
synclk_x5ms!
x=0
x==ARBI_PERIOD
synclk_xms!
x=0,
clear_fifo()
Startup
y <= RUB
NoPower
x<=1&&
y<=1
Reset
x<= C
Processing
y<=WD_UB
Idle
y<=WD_UB
demotion[i] == 0
synclk_xms?
x=0
demotion[i] == 0
synclk_xms?
x=0
demotion[i] == 0 && y==WD_UB
x=0, y=0,
flag[i] = 1
demotion[i] == 0 && y == C
x = 0, y = 0 
flag[i] = 0
demotion[i]==1
imme!
x=0,y=0
demotion[i] == 1
imme!
x=0,y=0
demotion[i] == 0
dsp_restart[i]?
x=0, y=0,
flag[i] = 0
demotion[i] == 0 && y<= RUB
x=0
demotion[i] == 0
synclk_xms?
x=0
demotion[i] == 0
dsp_restart[i]?
x=0, y=0,
flag[i] = 0
demotion[i] == 0
y = RWD,x = 0
demotion[i] == 1
imme!
x=0,y=0
x==1&&y==1
x=0,y=0
demotion[i] == 0 && y==WD_UB
x=0, y=0,
flag[i] = 0
demotion[i] == 1
imme!
x=0,y=0
demotion[i] == 0 && x >=CPU_PERIOD
cpu_voter_fifo[i] = 0,
x = 0 , y =RWD
output:int[1,6]
demotion[i] == 0 && x <CPU_PERIOD
cpu_voter_fifo[i] = output,
x = 0,y = RWD
demotion[i] == 0
y = RWD
demotion[i] == 0
dsp_restart[i]?
x=0, y=0,
flag[i] = 0
demotion[i] == 0 && 
y == WD_UB
x=0, y=0,
flag[i] = 0
demotion[i] == 0
dsp_restart[i]?
x=0, y=0,
flag[i] = 0
demotion[i] == 0
synclk_xms?
x = 0
a) b)
Fig. 2. a) Impulse automaton b) CPU automaton
3.2 CPU
Fig.2(b) displays the automaton CPU[i], where i is the index of a CPU.
imme?
Fig. 3. Demoter automaton
There are two clocks x,y in the automaton, where x is used to measure the data
processing time, y is used to measure the waiting time of the watchdog timer. The
CPU reset and startup phases are embodied by means of the locations Reset and
Startup and the transitions in between them.
After the startup phase, CPU[i] stays in Idle to wait for a CPU synchronization
impulse. In reality, the CPU has its own real state: the non-faulty state and the faulty
state. In the case of the non-faulty state, the CPU kicks its watchdog with the timer
set to RWD, where we use a transition surrounding Idle to indicate that. For the
faulty case, it ceases doing this. As a result, the watchdog timer settles in Idle and
will reach the limit WD UB with the time being elapsed, which forces the automaton
to restart. Each outgoing transition from location Idle to Reset denotes a restart
phenomenon. Once a synchronization impulse synclk xms occurs, that is, when a
synclk xmx? transition occurs, The CPU may either transit to location Processing
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with clock x reset to 0 if CPU is non-faulty, or to location Idle again if the CPU is
faulty.
In location Processing, the CPU processes the sampling data and outputs the
result to buﬀer cpu voter fifo[i]. The waiting period is modeled by resetting the
clock x upon entering location Processing and by bounding the time of the CPU
may staying in this location with the invariant y ≤ WD UB. In this location, the CPU
may kick the watchdog, or stop doing so which leads to the timer overﬂow and a
consequent move to location Reset. Two outgoing transitions from Processing to
Idle model the computation timeout and non-timeout cases.
Whenever the watchdog timer overﬂows or receives a dsp restart[i]? sig-
nal from the arbitrator, CPU[i] will switch to Reset without time delay, and set
flag[i] to 0. This occurs in any of the active locations: Reset, Startup , Idle
and Processing. The fact that dsp restart[0]? being an urgent channel ensures
the transition is taken immediately as it is enabled. The location Nopower in the
automaton designates that CPU[i] has a permanent fault and is turned oﬀ. From
any of the locations, except for NoPower, CPU[i] transits to NoPower immediately
after it detects that the arbitrator has decided this CPU has a permanent fault, i.e.
demotion[i] == 1.
3.3 Voter
The automaton Voter[j] is shown in Fig. 4(a), where j is the index of a voter. A
clock x is used to record the voter processing time. We introduce a local variable
cpu error time[i] to record the number of incorrect data that the voter obtained
from CPU[i]. Initially the automaton stays in its Idle location. As soon as it
receives a synclk 5ms signal, it immediately jumps to location Processing with x
reset to zero. The processing time is non deterministic, but bounded in the interval
[0, VOTER PERIOD). As to the transition from Processing to Idle, Voter[j] calls
two functions: fault check() and vote(). The function fault check() is deﬁned
as follows.
void fault_check() {
int i;
for(i = 0; i < 3; i++)
{ restart_flag_by_voter[i + id * 3] = 0; }
for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
if(demotion[i] == 0)//CPU i is not in NoPower location
{ if (local_flag[i]==1 && flag[i]==0) //edge jumps
{cpu_error_time[i] = 0; //set cpu error time to 0
cpu_normal_by_voter[i]=0; //judge CPU i is in non-normal state
if(restart_count_by_voter[i + id * 3] >= 6) //CPU i restart times exceeds 6
restart_count_by_voter[i + id * 3] = 6;
else // CPU i restart times does not exceed 6
restart_count_by_voter[i + id * 3]++;
}
local_flag[i] = flag[i]; //local_flag is updated
if(cpu_voter_fifo[i] == 0) //data from CPU i is not correct
{cpu_error_time[i]++;
if(cpu_normal_by_voter[i] == 1) //CPU i is in normal state
{if(cpu_error_time[i] >= n1)
{cpu_error_time[i] = n1;
restart_flag_by_voter[i + id * 3] = 1; //CPU i needs a restart
}
}
else // CPU i is non-normal state
{if(cpu_error_time[i] >= n2)
{cpu_error_time[i] = n2;
restart_flag_by_voter[i + id * 3] = 1; //CPU i needs a restart
}
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}
}
else // data from CPU i is correct
{ cpu_error_time[i] = 0;
restart_count_by_voter[i + id * 3]=0;
cpu_normal_by_voter[i]=1; //CPU i is in normal state
}
}
}
}
Processing
x<VOTER_PERIOD
Idle
fault_check(),
vote(),
x=0
voter_status[i] == 0
synclk_x5ms?
x = 0
Send
Processing
x<ARBI_PERIOD
Idle
reset_flag_by_arbi[0] == 0 && 
reset_flag_by_arbi[1] == 0 && 
reset_flag_by_arbi[2] == 0
i : int[0,2]
reset_flag_by_arbi[i]==1
dsp_reset[i]!
reset_flag_by_arbi[i]=0
arbitrate(),
x=0
synclk_x9ms?
x = 0
a) b)
Fig. 4. a)Voter automaton b) Arbitrator automaton
3.4 Arbitrator
The automaton Arbitrator resides in Idle initially, whenever synclk x9mx is
issued; that is when a synclk x9mx? transition occurs, it jumps to location
Processing and stays there non-deterministically in the interval [0, ARBI PERIOD).
It then switches to Idle by completing the function arbitrate(). We use a lo-
cal boolean variable restart flag by arbi[i] to express if CPU[i] needs to restart
judged by automaton Arbitrator.
void arbitrate() {
int i;
if(voter_status[0] == 0) // voter 0 is good
arbitrator_data = voter_output[0];
else // voter 1 is good
arbitrator_data = voter_output[1];
for(i = 0; i < 3; i++)
{restart_flag_by_arbi[i] = 0;
if
{ if(voter_status[0] == 0)// voter0 is good
{restart_flag_by_arbi[i] = restart_flag_by_voter[i];
if(retart_count_by_voter[i] == 6) // CPU i restart times exceeds 6
{demotion[i] = 1; //switch off CPU i
restart_flag_by_arbi[i] = 0; //CPU i does not need a restart
}
}
else // voter1 is good
{restart_flag_by_arbi[i] = restart_flag_by_voter[i + 3];
if(restart_count_by_voter[i + 3] == 6)
{demotion[i] = 1;
restart_flag_by_arbi[i] = 0;
}
}
}
}
}
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4 Parametric Constraints
4.1 The Desired Property
Veriﬁcation of the above model in UPPAAL reveals that both watchdog and arbitra-
tor can trigger a CPU to restart. This can solve the problems proposed in section 3.
However, we also found unpleasant scenario regarding a CPU restart. Since there is
no information intersection in between any two CPUs, and each voter independently
judges that whether or not there exists a CPU restart, in the following section, we
use a product automaton of these four automata: CPU[0], Voter[0], Arbitrator and
Impulse to describe the phenomena, the parametric constraints and the proof.
With respect to CPU[0] recovery to normal state as soon as possible when it
restarts, we expect that by setting the parameters, the current system satisﬁes the
requirement–“ When a CPU is in the startup phase, it should not restart again due
to its watchdog timer overﬂow or a restart signal sent from the arbitrator ”. More
speciﬁcally, we prove that:
• T 1 : CPU[0].Startup→ Arbitrator.restart flag by arbi[0] = 0
• T 2 : CPU[0].Startup→ CPU[0].y < WD UB
Here → means “imply”. By testing a lot in UPPAAL with diﬀerent sets of
parameter values, we found that the above properties can be either satisﬁed or
not. This gives us the intuition that the properties hold under certain parametric
constraints. So, the interesting work now is to ﬁnd the constraints and prove that
for any parameters values that meets the constraints, the properties hold.
4.2 Parametric Constraints
As described before, there are a number of key timing parameters in the system:
the time period CPU PERIOD between synclk xms and synclk 5xms impulse, the time
period VOTER PERIOD between synclk 5xms and synclk 9xms impulse, the time pe-
riod ARBI PERIOD between synclk 9xms and synclk xms impulse, and the impulse
cycle T. In addition to these, there is also the parameters n1 and n2, the reset time
C, the upper bound RUB in CPU startup phase. These parameters have been set to
diﬀerent values and have been shown to inﬂuence the above property greatly.
The following lemma is needed to support our explanation to parametric con-
straints.
Lemma 4.1 Function fault check() of Voter[0] will judge that CPU[0] needs a
restart or not, CPU[0] is normal or not, ect., and is executed in the transition
of Voter[0] from location Processing to location Idle. The transition is labeled as
S. For any cycle M, let the time point that S happens is a, and the next cycle
M + 1, the time point that S happens is b, then the time diﬀerence between a and
b is (ARBI PERIOD+CPU PERIOD, T+VOTER PERIOD).
Proof. This lemma can be easily proved since the processing time of Voter[0] lies
in the interval [0, ARBI PERIOD). 
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Below we give the constraints on the parameters, and show by counterexamples
that they are necessary to prove that properties T 1 and T 2 do hold by the tran-
sitions of the network of automata. In the next section we will establish that the
proposed constraints are also suﬃcient for correctness.
T+ VOTER PERIOD ≤ C(1)
WD UB > RUB(2)
n1 > 
RUB+ C
T
+ 2(3)
T+ VOTER PERIOD < C in inequality (1) is used to ensure that fault check() of
Voter[0] can ﬁnd the update of variable flag[0], so as to update the related variables
correctly. To illustrate this, suppose at time t, Voter[0] ﬁnishes the execution of
functions fault check() and vote(). The computation is done with local flag[0]
and cpu normal by voter[0] respectively set to 1. At the same time but follows
the execution, CPU[0] enters into location Reset with flag[0] set to 0. We denote
this reset as R (This scenario can be easily found in UPPAAL). By lemma 4.1, it
might be that at time point t1, t1 = t+ T+ VOTER PERIOD− , where  is inﬁnite
small, fault check() is executed for the ﬁrst time since the time point t. However,
if T+ VOTER PERIOD > C, then at time t2, t2 = C < t+ T+ VOTER PERIOD, CPU[0]
transits to location Startup from location Reset, meanwhile sets flag[0] to 1.
As a result, at time t1, since both values of flag[0] and local flag[0] are 1,
function fault check() is not able to detect the reset R. According to the CPU
reset mechanism, when cpu normal by voter[0] is equal to 1, Voter[0] allows for
n2 incorrect data before the judgement of CPU[0] restart. Since CPU[0] can stay
in location Startup for RUB units and n2  n1, with time elapsed the value of
restart flag by arbi[0] could be 1. So, there exits the scenario that the CPU can
transit from Startup to Reset, which violates property T 1.
Inequality (2) is also needed to avoid a restart of CPU[0] in location Startup.
Suppose it is not satisﬁed, because CPU[0] enters into location Startup with y set
to 0, then after WD UB time units, watchdog timer may expire the constant WD UB.
This causes CPU[0] to move to location Reset again and hence violates property T 2.
Inequality (3) is used to give the maximum number of incorrect data of CPU[0]
that Voter[0] can tolerate since it judges that this CPU is non-normal. Consider the
case that CPU[0] stays in location Reset and y is equal to 0,cpu normal by voter[0]
is equal to 0. Since synclk 5xms is generated in a T cycle, and the value of
cpu normal by voter[0] does not change in location Reset and Startup, Voter[0]
therefore counts the number of incorrect data until the number equals RUB+C
T
+ 1.
It further judges that this CPU needs to restart. Violation of n1 > RUB+C
T
+ 1 will
lead to the phenomenon of a CPU[0] restart in location Startup. In the inequality
“+2 ” is used to give more allowance.
5 Correctness Proof
Since UPPAAL can not deal with the veriﬁcation of the parametric constraints but
only of the ﬁxed parameters values, in the following, we prove T 1 and T 2 manually
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using a product automaton A of these automata: CPU[0], Impulse, Voter[0] and
Arbitrator.
To prove T 1, we need a list of additional invariants:
(i) I1 : CPU[0].Reset ∧ CPU[0].y > T→ cpu voter fifo[0] = 0
(ii) I2 : CPU[0].Startup ∧ CPU[0].y > 2T→ Voter[0].local flag[0] = 1
(iii) I3 : CPU[0].Idle→ Voter[0].local flag[0] = 1
(iv) I4 : CPU[0].Processing→ Voter[0].local flag[0] = 1
(v) Let α be the value of cpu normal by voter[0] as CPU[0] transits from location
Reset to location Startup, then
I5 : CPU[0].Startup→ Voter[0].cpu normal by voter[0] = α
(vi) I6 : CPU[0].Reset ∧ CPU[0].y > 2T→ Voter[0].cpu normal by voter[0] = 0
(vii) I7 : CPU[0].Reset ∧ CPU[0].y > 2T→ restart flag by voter[0] = 0
We now prove these lemmas.
Lemma 5.1 I1 : CPU[0].Reset ∧ CPU[0].y > T→ cpu voter fifo[0] = 0
Proof.
To prove this lemma, ﬁrst we need to prove an additional invariant I10. An
auxiliary boolean variable taken1 initialized to 0 is required to record if the
transition that synchronize with the action synclk xms is taken or not. The
assignment of the transition has an extra part: taken1 := 1. For all the discrete
transitions from location Reset to the other locations, taken1 is set to 0. We ﬁrst
prove the below invariant:
I10 : CPU[0].Reset ∧ taken1 = 1→ cpu voter fifo[0] = 0
In order to prove that I10 is an invariant, it suﬃces to prove that it holds
initially and is preserved by all discrete transitions as well as by all time delay steps
of A.
We consider all the transitions that arrive at location Reset, and all the tran-
sitions that update the value of taken1 or cpu voter fifo[0] when CPU[0] stays in
location Reset. For all the other transitions from state s, s |= I10, since the left
side of the formula is equivalent to false after the transition, it is trivial to observe
that I10′ holds.
Let ϕ1d be the time delay transition in location Reset, where d is a real number to
let all the clocks increment with this value. Let ϕ2 be the transition that synchronize
with the action synclk xms, ϕ3 be the transition that receives a signal dsp restart.
The left and the right transitions from location Idle to location Reset are ϕ4 and
ϕ5. The left and the right transitions from location Processing to location Reset
are ϕ6 and ϕ7. The top and the bottom transitions from location Startup to Reset
are ϕ8 and ϕ9.
Initially, since taken1 is 0, I10 is true. Suppose state s |= I10, we now prove
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for any of the above transition ϕ, s
ϕ
→ s′, s′ |= I10′. Namely, I10 ∧ ϕ→ I10′.
Ad1 Assume I10 ∧ ϕ1d, since transition ϕ1d does not change any value of the
variables appearing in the implication, clearly I10′ holds.
Ad2 Assume I10 ∧ ϕ2.
If taken1 is equal to 0, then taken1′ = 1 and cpu voter fifo[0]′ = 0.
If taken1 is equal to 1, then taken1′ = 1 and cpu voter fifo[0]′ = 0. So I10′
holds.
Ad3 Assume I10 ∧ ϕ3, clearly I10
′ holds.
Ad4 For any transition from ϕ4 to ϕ9, since taken1
′ is equal to 0, I10′ holds.
We conclude that I10 is an invariant. Because synclk xms is generated in a T
cycle, we have when y > T, taken1 is equal to 1. So, I1 is an invariant. We conclude
the proof.

Lemma 5.2 I2 : CPU[0].Startup ∧ CPU[0].y > 2T→ Voter[0].local flag[0] = 1
We can easily prove this lemma from lemma 4.1.
Lemma 5.3 I3 : CPU[0].Idle→ Voter[0].local flag[0] = 1
Lemma 5.4 I4 : CPU[0].Processing→ Voter[0].local flag[0] = 1
Lemma 5.3 and lemma 5.4 follow from lemma 5.2.
Lemma 5.5 I5 : CPU[0].Startup→ Voter[0].cpu normal by voter[0] = α
Proof. After the transition from location Reset to location Startup, the value
of flag[0] is set to 1. By lemma 5.1 and constraint 1, cpu voter fifo[0] is
equal to 1 in location Startup. Since the value of cpu normal by voter[0]
can only be updated either in the case CPU[0] reads a correct data, namely
cpu voter fifo[0] = 1, or in the case there is a value change of flag[0], namely
flag[0] = 0 ∧ local flag[0] = 1, we have for any other discrete transitions or time
delay transitions, cpu normal by voter[0]′ = α. 
Lemma 5.6 I6 : CPU[0].Reset ∧ CPU[0].y > 2T→ cpu normal by voter[0] = 0
Proof. Analogous to the proof of the invariant I1, we also need to prove an
additional invariant I60. Let ϕ10 be the transition in A that transits from location
Processing to Idle. We introduce an auxiliary boolean variable taken2 to record
if the transition ϕ10 is taken or not. The variable is initially set to 0. For all the
discrete transitions from location Reset to the other locations, taken2 is set to 0.
And the assignment of the transition ϕ10 has an extra part: taken2 := 1. We now
prove the below invariant:
I60 : CPU[0].Reset ∧ taken2 = 1→ cpu normal by voter[0] = 0
Similarly, we consider all the transitions in A that arrive at location Reset, and
all the transitions that update the value of taken2 or cpu normal by voter[0] when
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CPU0 stays in location Reset. For all the other transitions from state s, s |= I60,
since the left side of the formula is equivalent to false after the transition, it is trivial
to observe that I60′ holds.
Then, we have the following implications:
(i) I60 ∧ ϕ1d → I60
′.
(ii) I60 ∧ ϕ2 → I60
′.
(iii) I60 ∧ ϕ3 → I60
′.
(iv) I60 ∧ ϕ4 → I60
′.
(v) I60 ∧ ϕ5 → I60
′.
(vi) I60 ∧ ϕ6 → I60
′.
(vii) I60 ∧ ϕ7 → I60
′.
(viii) I60 ∧ ϕ8 → I60
′.
(ix) I60 ∧ ϕ9 → I60
′.
(x) I60 ∧ ϕ10 → I60
′.
Ad1 Since any of the transitions: ϕ1d, ϕ2 and ϕ3, does not change the value of
taken2, neither of cpu normal by voter[0], clearly I60′ holds.
Ad2 For any of the transitions from ϕ4 to ϕ9, clearly I60
′ holds since taken2′ = 0.
Ad3 Assume I6 ∧ ϕ10. We consider two cases (1) taken2 = 0 (2) taken2 = 1.
Also, we introduce two auxiliary boolean variables from1 and from2, to indicate
that from which location (excluding the location Reset itself) Reset is reached.
Initially, these two variables are set to 0. For the transition from location Reset to
Startup, it has an extra update from1 := 0 ∧ from2 := 0. If the location Reset is
reached from location Startup, from1 is set to 1. So for the two transitions from
location Startup to location Reset, they respectively have the update from1 := 1.
Similarly, if the location Reset is reached from location Idle or Processing,
from2 is set to 1. Therefore, we have the update from2 := 1 for any transition
from location Idle or Processing to location Reset.
CASE 1. When taken2 = 0. The combinational values of from1 and from2 have
three cases:
(1) from1 = 0 ∧ from2 = 0.
Since the value of cpu normal by voter[0] is initially 0, and any of the transi-
tions ϕ1d, ϕ2 and ϕ3 does not change this value, we observe that also after transition
ϕ10, cpu normal by voter[0]
′ = 0.
(2) from1 = 1 ∧ from2 = 0
Assume when CPU[0] stays in location Startup, cpu normal by voter[0] = 1.
By lemma 5.5, cpu normal by voter[0] is equal to 1 after the CPU transits to Reset
from Startup. Since the value of cpu normal by voter[0] is not changed by any of
the transitions ϕ1d, ϕ2 and ϕ3, we observe that also after transition ϕ10, the value
of cpu normal by voter[0]′ is 1. This result contradicts our assumption I60 when
taken2 = 1. So the case that when CPU[0] stays in location Startup, the value of
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cpu normal by voter[0] being 1 does not exist. Assume that when CPU[0] stays in
location Startup, cpu normal by voter[0] is equal to 0. We can prove I60′ holds.
(3) from1 = 0 ∧ from2 = 1
In this case, flag[0] is equal to 0. Further by lemmas 5.3 and 5.4, we have
local flag[0] = 1. Therefore Voter[0].cpu normal by voter[0]′ = 0.
CASE 2. When taken2 = 1. In this case, Voter[0].local flag[0] is equal to 0 and
cpu voter fifo[0] = 0. Therefore for any value case of from1 and from2, the value
of Voter[0].cpu normal by voter[0] is not changed.
Further by the fact that I60 initially holds, we conclude that I60 is an invariant.
By lemma 4.1, we have when y > 2T, taken2 is equal to 1. So I6 is an invariant.
Lemma 5.7 I7 : CPU[0].Reset ∧ CPU[0].y > 2T→ restart flag by voter[0] = 0
Lemma 5.8 When CPU[0] is in startup process, in other words, CPU[0] stays in
location Startup in the CPU automaton, then CPU[0] should not get a restart signal
from the arbitrator. That is, we have the invariant
T 1 : CPU[0].Startup→ Arbitrator.restart flag by arbi[0] = 0
This lemma follows from lemma 5.6 and 5.7, as well as constraint 1 and constraint
3.
Theorem 5.9 When CPU[0] is in the startup phase, it should not restart again
due to its watchdog timer overﬂow or a restart signal sent from the arbitrator. That
is, property T holds.
T : T 1 ∧ T 2
Proof. When clock y equals WD UB, CPU[0] will switch to location Reset. Because of
constraint 2, watchdog timer will not expire the constant WD UB in location Startup.
So the transition to Reset can not be taken, T 2 holds. Further by lemma 5.8, we
conclude the proof. 
6 Conclusion
We present our preliminary work on an improved triple modular fault tolerant
system taken from the aerospace ﬁeld. We expect that the improved system should
satisfy the engineering requirements, one of the most important one is that “ When
a CPU is in the startup phase, it should not restart again due to its watchdog timer
overﬂow or a restart signal sent from the arbitrator ”. Rather than verifying the
correctness of the system for a single, speciﬁc choice of parameter values like in
UPPAAL, we derive (by hand) general constraints on the parameters which ensure
correctness and give the correctness proof. Validity of the correctness property
will give the engineers a guideline for choosing parameters values in real hardware
implementation.
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